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Although it is obligatory to mark the anniversary of Brown v. 
Board of Education, why it deserves to be commemorated is not 
necessarily obvious at a distance of fifty years. The decision itself, 
Richard Kluger made clear in Simple Justice, was unprepossessing and 
unassertive.1 Delivered in pedestrian language, “the only soaring 
sentence,” he rightly pointed out, claimed that segregation could affect 
Black children’s “hearts and minds in a way unlikely to be ever 
undone” (p. 705).The decision, in fact, emphasized the psychological 
damage African Americans putatively experienced rather than exposed 
the hypocrisy of Plessy v. Ferguson’s contention that racial 
classifications were not designed to impose an inferior standing on 
Black people.2 Additionally, this emphasis on psychological damage 
was supported by social science citations which gave top billing to 
Kenneth Clark, whose dubious research on African-American children’s 
doll preferences had been persuasively critiqued by opposing counsel 
John W. Davis, and, according to Kluger, had even been “the source of 
considerable derision” among some of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) lawyers (p. 321).3 Finally, an 
implementation decision was deferred until Brown II, which a year 
later required that desegregation proceed “with all deliberate speed,” 
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limited relief to plaintiffs in the offending districts, left the nature of 
that relief to the district judges who had ruled against desegregation, 
and unleashed vigorous white resistance across much of the South.  
 
Under these circumstances “deliberate” inevitably outweighed 
“speed,” and the progress of school desegregation was slight until the 
late 1960s when an increasingly aggressive Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) and stringent Supreme Court decisions 
in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County (1968) and 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg (1971) engendered significant 
desegregation in the South, and Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1 
(1973) created a basis for court-ordered desegregation in the North as 
well. In the year of the last decision, however, the Court maintained in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that correcting 
funding imbalances between districts was not the business of the 
federal government, and by then the Nixon administration had gutted 
the oversight powers of HEW. Subsequently, Milliken v. Bradley (1974) 
ruled against metropolitan desegregation in Detroit and curtailed 
sharply the possibilities for assaults on segregation in the urban North. 
Milliken and Rodriguez combined, in effect, federally sanctioned both 
separate and unequal education in northern cities.4 While Milliken 
limited the reach of desegregation suits, three decisions in the 1990s 
limited the obligations of court-supervised districts to end segregation 
and led to the release of many districts from court oversight.5 Where 
oversight continued, it often became lax. Not surprisingly, by several 
measures school segregation rose continuously from the late 1980s 
through 2000-2001.6 At Brown’s fortieth anniversary, Judge Robert 
Carter, formerly the NAACP attorney who argued the Topeka case, 
registered deep disappointment: “Thus far, for most black children the 
constitutional guarantee of equal educational opportunity that Brown 
held was secured to them has been an arid abstraction, having no 
effect whatsoever on the bleak educational offerings black children are 
given in the deteriorating schools they attend.”7 More recently, Mark 
Tushnet, the leading expert on the NAACP’s legal strategy, maintained 
that “[b]y the turn of the century, the experiment with court-ordered 
segregation had effectively ended, largely a failure.”8  
 
Today the widespread existence of separate and unequal 
education—to say nothing of the problem of together but unequal 
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education in desegregated schools—may make Brown seem especially 
small and distant. Yet Richard Kluger’s Simple Justice, which views 
Brown from its past rather than its future, recaptures its significance 
by relating how much sacrifice it took to produce it and how much 
progress it represented at the time. Although Simple Justice is a self-
important book-massive and sweeping and prone at times to 
employing faux biblical language-it is also remains the most important 
as well as the most exhaustive book on Brown. Indefatigably 
researched, eloquently written, and displaying the skills of a superb 
raconteur, the book was meant to be accessible to a broad readership 
and at the same time won immediate praise from legal scholars, 
political scientists, and historians.9 Recent work on Brown continues to 
acknowledge the significance of Kluger’s book and draws on it 
liberally.10  
 
Against a background of African-Americans’ changing 
circumstances that Kluger paints in broad strokes, Simple Justice 
guides the reader through the devolution and evolution of the law-
from the post-Reconstruction legal decisions that gutted the 
Fourteenth Amendment to, in essence, its slow restoration through a 
series of NAACP victories that culminated in Brown. Along the way 
there are impressive discussions of cases-in particular an extended, 
passionate, illuminating discourse on Plessy—but Kluger focuses on the 
process by which the justices reached a decision in Brown and, more 
extensively, the legal strategy the NAACP employed that made the 
decision possible. 
 
In addressing the former, Kluger draws upon an extraordinary 
cache of primary sources, including the diary of Justice Burton, the 
conference notes of Justices Burton, Clark, and Frankfurter, the 
letters, memos, and notes of Frankfurter, and interviews with two 
justices, as well as many former Supreme Court clerks. Kluger deftly 
excavates the justices’ politics, personalities, internecine tensions, and 
attitudes toward overturning legal precedent and offending the South. 
He lays out what a stronger decision might have said, but persuasively 
concludes that the actual language of Brown could only have been 
improved upon at the cost of destroying the fragile unanimity this 
deeply divided body was able to reach once Earl Warren replaced Fred 
Vinson as chief justice.  
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Long before the NAACP could have deciphered the quirks and 
proclivities of the justices who decided Brown, it mapped out a 
desegregation strategy. The provision of resources between Black and 
white schools had become increasingly unequal over the first three 
decades of the century.11 Beginning in the early 1930s the NAACP 
adopted the tactic of pursuing suits that raised the cost of segregation 
through seeking equalization of teachers’ salaries and school facilities 
at the elementary and secondary levels. It simultaneously pursued the 
desegregation of public graduate schools. These institutions were 
especially vulnerable, Kluger notes, because separate schools were not 
provided to Black students. In addition, the small number of students 
involved and the maturity of graduate students diminished the threat 
to white southerners. Even then, the NAACP was attentive to white 
sensibilities in its choice of plaintiffs. Kluger points out, for instance, 
that Thurgood Marshall chose George McLaurin because he was an 
unlikely candidate for intermarriage at the age of 68. The NAACP also 
chose to litigate in border states where racial attitudes were less 
hardened than in the deep South. A far cry from the fierce opposition 
Autherine Lucy faced when she attempted to enroll in graduate school 
at the University of Alabama two years after Brown, Kluger documents 
considerable support for the plaintiffs among white students. In fact, 
white supporters of Herman Sweatt’s entry into the University of Texas 
Law School created for a time an all-white NAACP branch of some 200 
members.  
 
Victories for the NAACP in Sweatt v.Painter and McLaurin 
v.Oklahoma in 1950, Kluger demonstrates, hinged on intangible 
factors limiting students’ professional opportunities in ways that 
derived from separation itself rather than inequality of resources, and 
these decisions emboldened the NAACP to directly assault school 
segregation. At this point, Kluger explains, the NAACP’s often maligned 
social science evidence helped the justices rule that separate 
elementary and high schools, like graduate schools, inherently were 
unequal due to intangible factors, though here the factors were 
psychological rather than professional. In addition, changed 
conceptions of race among social scientists since the white 
supremacist norm of the early twentieth century and their almost 
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universal support for integration left defendants’ attorneys with little 
contemporary authority to counter the NAACP.  
 
Although subsequent scholarship on the NAACP’s effort to 
dismantle desegregation is more attentive to the influence of its 
organizational needs and views its tactics as less linear than Kluger, 
such work does not constitute a substantial revision of Simple 
Justice.12 Yet perhaps a more enduring contribution than his discussion 
of the NAACP’s legal activity is the way he locates it at the nexus of a 
still largely unheralded world of extraordinary African-American 
intellectual accomplishment that managed to flourish under 
unfavorable circumstances. At a time when few African-American 
adults reached high school, a number of NAACP attorneys had 
amassed exceptional educational credentials. Charles Hamilton 
Houston and his cousin William Hastie both acquired degrees from 
Amherst and Harvard Law School. William Coleman, Jr. graduated with 
honors from the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Law. Louis 
Redding completed degrees at Brown and Harvard Law. James Nabrit 
was at the top of his class at Northwestern University Law School. Not 
only were these lawyers’ credentials extraordinary, Kluger emphasizes, 
so too was the legal acumen, the tireless effort, and often the courage 
they and the other leading NAACP attorneys displayed as they sought 
to upset the racial order.  
 
While the NAACP gathered together these talents, Kluger does 
not overlook other Black institutions that nourished the attorneys. 
Charles Houston had attended the M Street High School in 
Washington, D.C., where Black students outperformed the students in 
the white schools, and William Hastie attended it as well after it had 
been renamed Dunbar. Both Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter 
attended Lincoln University, the “Black Princeton,” according to Kluger. 
They both went on to Howard University Law School, which Dean 
Charles Houston had transformed into a high-quality institution 
focused on civil rights.  
 
African-American scholarship also was an important resource to 
the attorneys. One major location for this work was the Journal of 
Negro Education founded by Charles Thompson in 1932. In a double 
irony, the defendants’ attorney John Davis tried to draw scholarly 
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support for segregated schools from this journal and W.E.B. Du Bois 
was his source. Du Bois, of course, an NAACP founder, editor of its 
publication The Crisis, and perhaps the nation’s most accomplished 
scholar, in the 1930s had come to question the single-minded pursuit 
of desegregation and left the organization in 1934. Kluger quite deftly 
and economically uncovers Davis’s distorted interpretation of DuBois’s 
“Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?” Kluger, in fact, often 
combines a real depth of scholarship with a journalistic pithiness. In a 
mere page, for instance, he impressively capsulizes the important 
scholarly work of Black college president Horace Mann Bond. And if at 
times he uses lightweight phrasing to capture an individual—Charles 
Houston was “smart as a whip and handsome as a movie star. . .” (p. 
105)—he probably gets Du Bois right when he says, “He was an elitist 
who suffered for and with the masses without ever joining them” (p. 
327).  
 
What Kluger most importantly demonstrates about the 
educational work of the NAACP is that it tapped into an age old, 
insistent demand for education by African Americans and both drew 
upon and nurtured grass roots activism in order to change the law. 
The epigraph to the book comes from a 1787 African American petition 
to the state legislature of Massachusetts. It acknowledged the unjust 
denial of many privileges but sought redress for only “a great 
grievance,” the barring of Black children from the public schools of 
Boston. “We therefore pray your Honors,” the petition concludes, “that 
you would in your wisdom some provision would be made for the free 
education of our dear children. And in duty bound shall ever pray” (p. 
2). Some 170 years elapsed between the petition and the experiences 
of Reverend Joseph A. DeLaine that are described next: “Before it was 
over, they fired him from the little schoolhouse at which he had taught 
devotedly for ten years. And they fired his wife and two of his sisters 
and a niece. And they threatened him with bodily harm. And they sued 
him on trumped up charges and convicted him in a kangaroo court and 
left him with a judgment that denied him credit from any bank. And 
they burned his house to the ground while the fire department stood 
around watching the flames consume the night. And they stoned the 
church at which he pastored. And fired shot guns at him out of the 
dark” (p. 4).This price paid by Reverend DeLaine was not unique 
among the petitioners in Clarendon County who, after being denied 
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school buses for their children, broadly pursued separate but equal 
schooling, and finally sought desegregation in Briggs v. Elliott, one of 
the five suits that would compose Brown v. Board of Education. 
Referring to the quotation above, Charles Payne maintains that “[b]y 
beginning his discussion not with the Event itself but with the people 
at the bottom of the process—not with lawyers or presidents or judges 
or civil rights organizations—Kluger makes it clear that the Big Event 
grew out of a tradition of struggle.13 Taken together, the epigraph and 
the opening paragraph suggest not only the long trajectory of African-
Americans’ profound belief in the liberating potential of education, but 
also their willingness to demand it. The “agrarian revolt” (p. 25) in 
Clarendon County, student strikes in Washington D.C. and Prince 
Edward County, and the surfacing of community supported, risk-taking 
plaintiffs in locations throughout the South all were expressions of that 
demand fortified by NAACP equalization victories and an enhanced 
opportunity for real redress from flagrant inequalities.14  
 
So much of the book is about Black genius, Black struggle, and 
Black courage that certain of Kluger’s formulations—especially in his 
epilogue—seem glaringly incongruous. Epilogues to historical works 
often are not friendly to books that otherwise have significant lasting 
power. They tend to be hurried and shallow as they bring the past up 
to the present and make predictions in this case a promising future for 
further desegregation that often turn out to be wrong. In the body of 
the book Kluger does an excellent job of trying to understand why 
people acted the way they did and of showing respect even for those 
whom he criticizes. That sensibility falls away when he reaches the mid 
1960s as Kluger makes no real effort to understand Black anger and 
militance from the inside out. He glibly depicts posturing and 
irresponsible Black intellectuals who abandon an agenda focused on 
desegregation and ignite the passions of “inarticulate ghetto dwellers, 
still trapped by poverty and ignorance. . .” who in turn set cities 
aflame in a paroxysm of self-hatred. Further, Kluger does not distance 
himself from what he claims are whites’ hostile views toward Black 
power demands which he tosses out without comment, nor does he 
distance himself from their apparently monolithic view that the Black 
Panthers “came on like unleashed killers ready to spatter The Man 
against the wall” (p. 762).  
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Although the book powerfully illustrates a dialectic between 
African American political struggle and the law, it is as if Kluger 
believes that struggle should end or be constrained to take on civil 
forms once the law announces formal equality, regardless of the 
profound inequities it leaves undisturbed. Kluger, in fact, responds to 
Brown II, which barely dented segregation, with surprising equanimity, 
even favor. Perhaps it was the best decision under the circumstances, 
but he fails to subject it to the critical scrutiny he applies to prior 
decisions. This is odd not only because massive resistance followed 
Brown II but also because a number of scholars who had analyzed the 
decision held it responsible for that resistance.15 Furthermore, in 
response to the Court’s decision to leave desegregation in the hands of 
southern judges, Kluger offers thls strange formulation: “And perhaps 
the nine men in Washington knew that only the white South could 
truly liberate the black South” (p. 746).It is hard to know exactly what 
Huger is trying to say here because the opposite was so obviously the 
case. But it is meant, I think, to exonerate a timid decision by 
assuming Brown II would ultimately spur southern whites 
magnanimity toward apparently hapless African-Americans.  
 
If an image of ineffectual Blacks relying on southern white 
largesse is a far cry from the destructive Blacks of the 1960s that 
Huger describes, both characterizations of African Americans trace to 
broad formulations that occasionally surface in the book. Published a 
year before Herbert Gut man’s pathbreaking The Black Family and 
Slavery and Freedom, perhaps it is understandable that Kluger 
believes that Black families were profoundly damaged during slavery, 
but it is less understandable, given the weight of the evidence he 
accumulates to the contrary, that he appears to buy into contemporary 
notions that African Americans remained culturally deprived and 
psychologically wounded—just as social science citations attached to 
Brown contended and to believe that separate schools necessarily 
contributed to the damage (pp. 28, 320, 170-171). Consequently, he 
apparently cannot appreciate why there was strong sentiment in some 
Black communities to hold on to separate schools and why the 
NAACP’s exclusive focus on desegregation sometimes met skepticism, 
especially when resources, as in Topeka, were roughly equivalent 
between Black and white schools (pp. 391-395).  
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If it seems that Kluger did not read his own book carefully, a 
minor subtext of depoliticized law and African-American pathology 
detracts little from the main text. Overall, Kluger’s passionate, 
powerful, monumental volume makes it clear that Brown—despite its 
unfulfilled promise—should not be relegated to an archive shelf or 
reduced merely to a source of authority that both the left and right can 
claim to support policy agendas today.16 Leon Litwack reminds us that 
in the South, “The separate and unequal school system stood as one of 
the principal legacies and cornerstones of white supremacy.”17 Albeit 
imperfectly, Brown, made possible by Black struggle and sacrifice, 
stood up to white supremacy, and Kluger impressively documents the 
long road to this achievement. Though Brown fell short of the 
“reconsecration of American ideals” (p. 710) that Kluger claims and 
less directly informed the civil rights movement than he suggests, it 
provided “a moral resource,” to use Mark Tushnet’s phrase, that 
buoyed the movement. Within limits, the movement then extended the 
reach of Brown and set us on what may be an even longer road from 
simple justice and formal equality to the complex justice a racially 
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